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The American Civil War is considered by many as the first of our modern wars. One of the significant evolutions of warfare during this period was in the area of small arms technology, specifically the fielding of the rifle and use of the Minie ball. This article will explore the impact of small arms technology on tactics during the American Civil War. The Napoleanic Wars of the early 19th Century, brought about only minor changes in tactics, for example skirmishers were utilized to move in front of units in column, after the skirmishers had located the enemy and fell back, the column formations would deploy on-line into attack formations for the assault. The frontal assault remained as the primary offensive tactic. As the U.S. Army entered the Mexican War (1845-1846), soldiers were issued the smooth bore musket as the primary small arms weapon of the infantry. The smoothbore musket did not possess rifling and fired a round lead ball. The effective range of the smoothbore musket was 200 yards. The Mississippi Rifle, fielded only to a very limited extent during the Mexican War, is credited as one of the first military rifles, it possessed rifling, and was considerably more accurate than the smoothbore musket however, its main disadvantage was that it fired a round ball making it difficult to reload and not as accurate as the future Minie Ball.[1] One of the first units to be fielded during the Mexican War with the Mississippi Rifle was commanded by Jefferson Davis, future U.S. Secretary of War and President of the Confederate States of America. The addition of the Minie ball in 1855, further improved the accuracy and effective range of the military rifle. The Minie ball was invented and utilized by the French with great success during the Crimean War. The Minie ball was a lead projectile tapering forward from a hollow base, it very much resembled today's bullet, the hollow base would expand into the rifling when fired allowing the rifling to spin the projectile. The Minie ball was as easy to load into a rifled musket as the round ball was to load into the smoothbore giving the rifle the same rate of fire but with a greater effective range and accuracy than the smoothbore musket. [2] Jefferson Davis, now serving as the United States Secretary of War, realized a great need existed in our Army for the rifled musket based upon his experience with the Mississippi Rifle during the Mexican War. In 1855, he ordered the production of only rifled muskets for the U.S. Army, by 1858, 4,000 of the new rifles existed in the U.S. Army inventory. The rifle in outward appearance closely resembled the musket, both were muzzle loaders, loaded from the muzzle end of the barrel. Both were single shot weapons and could only be fired approximately three times in one minute. The major difference was that the musket was a smoothbore weapon and the rifle included rifling in the barrel which gave the bullet a spinning action as it left the barrel, this spin greatly increased the accuracy and range of the rifle over that of the musket. Smoothbore muskets only had an effective range of 200 yards, the rifled musket increased this range out to 600 yards. The tactics of the musket included marching formations to within 200 yards of the enemy and then conducting frontal assaults utilizing the bayonet. These tactics were somewhat effective when the formations only had to cross over 200 yards of kill zone. The rifle just increased that kill zone to 600 yards of accurate fire.[3] At the same time that Secretary Davis realized that the rifle must be fielded, he also noted that tactics had not kept up with technology, he prescribed light infantry tactics to be taught as a formal part of military training and doctrine. An attempt was made to capture the recent lessons of the Mexican War and doctrinally adapt tactics to current technology. W.J. Hardee, a future General and Corps Commander in the Confederate Army, wrote a new manual, Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics, more commonly known as "Hardee's Tactics". His manual taught improved mobility and deployment of formations and taught the advantages of dispursement, cover, and concealment.[4] Unfortunately this was not enough to affect the opening battles of the Civil War. The first battles of the war reflected the tactics of the European and the Mexican Wars. These tactics included fighting battles in close formation, often in the open not utilizing any natural cover and at close range. The ranks of soldiers fired in volleys and were arrayed in shoulder-to-shoulder ranks. The concept was to concentrate as much firepower, in as small of a space as possible. However the potential impact of the rifle as a combat multiplier during defensive operations giving the defender a notable advantage over the attacker was quickly recognized as noted by a South Carolina, Confederate Soldier during the battle at Bull Run, "A battle is entered into mostly in as good order and with as close a drill front as the nature of the ground will permit, but at the first 'Pop! Pop!' of the rifles there comes a sudden loosening of the ranks, a freeing of selves impediment of contact, and every man goes to fighting on his own hook; firing as, and when he likes, and reloading as fast as he fires."[5] As both North and South fielded armies, they attempted to arm their soldiers with the rifled musket of the day. At the outbreak of the war the Confederate arsenals were estimated to only contain 15,000 rifles, the remaining 120,000 weapons were of the smoothbore variety, the Union was not much better equipped.[6] Utilizing industrial manufacture and importing rifles from Europe both sides were well equipped with rifles by 1863. As the war developed and armies increasingly were fielded with the rifle we notice two distinct changes in tactics. First the skirmish line was strengthened becoming the first wave of the attack while the troops behind supported the attack in waves. The Confederate Army adapted the tactic of attacking in small columns behind the skirmishers. The Union Army attacked in heavy columns. Second the defenders learned to protect themselves from the attack through the use of field fortifications, entrenchments, and entanglements to break up the attacker.[7] With the musket, soldiers only aimed in the direction of the enemy and fired volleys. The smoothbore was so inaccurate that a soldier was taught to aim in the general direction and the idea of the volley was to mass as much lead toward the enemy as possible. Prior to the rifle, marksmanship was not taught as an infantry skill. This skill became prominent during the Civil War and was indoctrinated into training at the company level. The accuracy of the rifle allowed soldiers to actually choose an individual target prior to firing. The accuracy of the rifle not only changed tactics but, impacted training as well, adapting training to improved tactics as a result of the change in small arms technology. By late 1864, both North and South had learned the lessons of hard fought battles well. Probably the greatest advantage was to the defender using a combination of breastworks and the rifle, it was nearly impossible to frontally assault entrenched defenders with any degree of success, as demonstrated at Cold Harbor.[8] At the battle of Spotsylvania in May 1864, the Army of the Potomac attempted a new method of attack against entrenched defenders. The Union forces attacked in a heavy column formation across a narrow front. The idea was to capture a section of trench and move on in column, the supporting units would move into the section of captured trench and fan out right and left taking the trench line, exploiting the breakthrough.[9] Most battles by this point of the war were fought as either turning movements to outflank your opponent and move him out of his prepared works or siege warfare virtually starving your opponent into submission. The frontal assault was now the exception rather than the rule. Frontal assaults resulted in devastating casualties for the attacker. On 3 July 1863, Confederate General Pickett was ordered to make a frontal assault with 15,000 soldiers across one mile of open ground against Union field fortifications. Pickett's casualties were staggering, suffering a loss of over one-third of his force. This frontal assault was the last action at the Battle of Gettysburg causing a defeat for the South and ended the South's invasion campaign of 1863.[10] On 3 June 1864, General Grant ordered a frontal assault against a well entrenched Confederate defender at Cold Harbor, VA. In the final assault the Union lost 13,000 casualties in one hour and the Confederates suffered only 1000 casualties.[11] On 31 November 1864, Confederate General Hood ordered a frontal assault against a Union defender with field fortifications erected at Franklin, TN. The South suffered 6,252 casualties, including five General Officers killed, while the North only 2,326 casualties. [12] The failure of the frontal assault and the success of the entrenched defender led to siege warfare as seen at Vicksburg (1863) and Petersburg (1864). Although, both campaigns ended in defeat for the defender, these tactics allowed a numerically inferior army to prolong the war by months against a far numerically superior enemy. These defensive tactics evolved as a direct result of the increased lethality of the rifled musket. The defensive tactics found successful during the American Civil War were common place during America's later major conflict, World War I during the early 20th Century. By relating the fielding of the rifled musket and the use of the Minie Ball within both the U.S. and Confederate Armies, the reader can quickly surmise how the evolution of technology preceded a revolution of warfare. [1]Rogers, H.C.B. The Confederates and Federals at War. Pp 32-33. New York, New York: Hippocrene Books, Inc., 1975. [2]Stofft, William A.. American Military History. Page 181. Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1989. [3]Catton, Bruce. Reflections on the Civil War. Pp. 126-127Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1981. [4]Rogers, H.C.B. The Confederates and Federals at War. Page 41. New York, New York: Hippocrene Books, Inc., 1975. [5] Jones, Archer. Civil War Command and Strategy. Page 30-31. New York, New York; The Free Press., 1992. [6]Rogers, H.C.B. The Confederates and Federals at War. Page 33. New York, New York: Hippocrene Books, Inc., 1975. [7]ibid. Page 41. [8]ibid. Page 45. [9]ibid. Page 44. [10] Catton, Bruce. Reflections on the Civil War. Page 128. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1981. [11]Rogers, H.C.B. The Confederates and Federals at War. Page 45. New York, New York: Hippocrene Books, Inc., 1975. [12]Jones, Archer and Herman Hattaway. How the North Won. Page 647. Chicago, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1983.