German Panzer Tanks, Tiger Tanks, Panther Tanks, WW2 Tanks, Guns and Firearm t shirts.

This is the same

t shirt design as before but with improved graphics and a different title font. The 2 differences in the Tiger are that I have taken out the turret hatch covers and are now closed. A Tiger I deployed to supplement the Afrika Korps operating in Tunisia, January 1943. Tiger I tanks during the Battle of Kursk, 1943. German soldiers inspect a non-penetrating hit to the Tiger's armor. Battle of Kursk. Tiger I hit by a Soviet 76.2 mm armor-piercing round from a tank cannon. Waffen-SS Tiger I engaging enemy tanks at long range during the Battle of Kursk, 1943. The Tiger's advanced optics and accurate main gun allowed it to effectively hit targets at extended ranges. The Tiger I camouflaged in a static defensive position. A Waffen-SS Tiger I advances through a field in France. Tigers were capable of destroying the American M4 Sherman or British Churchill IV at ranges exceeding 2,000 m. In contrast, the Soviet T-34 equipped with the 76.2 mm gun could not penetrate the Tiger frontally at any range, but could achieve a side penetration at approximately 500 m firing the BR-350P APCR ammunition. The T34-85's 85 mm gun could penetrate the Tiger from the side at about range 1,000 m. The IS-2's 122 mm gun could destroy the Tiger at ranges beyond 1,000 m. From a 30 degree angle of attack the M4 Sherman's 75 mm gun could not penetrate the Tiger frontally at any range, and needed to be within 100 m to achieve a side penetration against the 80mm upper hull superstructure. The British 17-pounder as used on the Sherman Firefly, firing its normal APCBC ammunition, could penetrate frontally out to over 1,000 m. The US 76 mm gun, if firing the APCBC M62 ammunition, could penetrate the Tiger frontally out to just over 500 m, and could be at ranges in excess of 1,000 m to achieve penetration against the upper hull superstructure. Using HVAP ammunition, which was in constant short supply and primarily issued to tank destroyers, frontal penetrations were possible out to just over 1,500 m. It is worth mentioning that many of the penetration capabilities at longer ranges had little relevance compared to combat engagements of the real war, especially that which was fought in Western Europe, where engagements rarely happened outside of one kilometer due to dispersion and chance for human error, which is amplified greatly as range increases regardless of the ability of any cannon. For example, while a 17pdr could penetrate the front armor of a Tiger I at one kilometer in tests, during real combat, a 17pdr gunner would probably never find himself in a position to actually attempt such a feat. As range decreases in combat, all guns can penetrate more armour (with the exception of HEAT ammunition, which was rare in World War II). The great penetrating power of the Tiger's gun meant that it could destroy many of its opponents at ranges at which they could not respond. In open terrain, this was a major tactical advantage. Opposing tanks were often forced to make a flanking attack in order to knock out a Tiger. The Tiger was first used in action in September 1942 near Leningrad. Under pressure from Hitler, the tank was put into action months earlier than planned and many early models proved to be mechanically fragile. In its first action on 23 September 1942, many of the first Tigers broke down. Others were knocked out by dug-in Soviet anti-tank guns. One tank was captured largely intact, which gave the Soviets a chance to study the

and prepare a response. In the Tiger's first actions in North Africa, the tank was able to dominate Allied tanks in the wide-open terrain. However, mechanical failures meant that there were rarely more than a few in action. In a replay of the Leningrad experience, at least one Tiger was knocked out by towed British six-pounder antitank guns. The tank's extreme weight limited the bridges it could cross and made drive-throughs of buildings, which may have had basements, risky. Another weakness was the slow traverse of the hydraulically-operated turret. The turret could also be traversed manually, but this option was rarely used, except probably for a fix of a few mils. Early Tigers had a top speed of about 45 km/h over optimal terrain. This was not recommended for normal operation, and was discouraged in training. Crews were told to not exceed 2600RPM due to reliability problems of the early Maybach engines at their maximum 3000RPM output. To combat this, the Tiger's top speed was reduced to about 38km/h through the installation of an engine governor, capping the RPM of the Maybach HL 230 to 2600rpm (HL 210s were used on early models). Despite being slower than medium tanks of the time, which averaged a top speed of about 45 km/h, the Tiger still had a very respectable speed for a tank of its size and weight, being nearly twice as heavy as a Sherman or T-34. The

had reliability problems throughout its service life; Tiger units frequently entered combat understrength due to breakdowns. It was rare for any Tiger unit to complete a road march without losing vehicles due to breakdown. The tank also had poor radius of action (distance a combat vehicle can travel and return, in normal battle conditions, without refueling). Due to its very wide tracks, the Tiger had a lower ground pressure bearing than many smaller tanks, the most notable exception being the Soviet T-34. The Tiger's armour and firepower, however, were feared by all its opponents. In tactical defence, its poor mobility was less of an issue. Whereas Panthers were the more serious threat to Allied tanks, Tigers had a bigger psychological effect on opposing crews, causing a "Tiger phobia". Allied tankers would sometimes evade rather than confront a Tiger, even a tank that only looked like one, such as the

IV with turret skirts applied. In the Normandy campaign, it could take four to five Shermans to knock out a single Tiger tank by maneuvering to its weaker flank or rear armour; the Soviet T-34s fared similarly against the

, as had the German Panzer III earlier against the Soviet heavy tanks. An accepted Allied tactic was to engage the Tiger as a group, one attracting the attention of the Tiger crew while the others attacked the sides or rear of the vehicle. Since the ammunition and fuel were stored in the sponsons, a side penetration often resulted in a kill. This was a risky tactic, and often resulted in the loss of several Allied vehicles. It took a great deal of tactical skill to eliminate a Tiger. Tigers were usually employed in separate heavy tank battalions (schwere-Panzer-Abteilung) under army command. These battalions would be deployed to critical sectors, either for breakthrough operations or, more typically, counterattacks. A few favoured divisions, such as the Grossdeutschland or some of the low-numbered Waffen-SS divisions had a handful of Tigers. The Tiger was originally designed to be offensive breakthrough weapon but by the time they came into action, the military situation had changed dramatically, and their main use was on the defensive as mobile gun batteries. [3] Unfortunately this also meant rushing the Tigers constantly from location to location causing excessive mechanical issues. As a result there are almost no instances where a Tiger Batallion went into combat at anything close to full strength. Furthermore, against the Soviet and Western Allied production numbers, even a 10:1 kill ratio would not have been sufficient for the Tigers. Some Tiger units did exceed the 10:1 kill ratio, including 13. Kompanie/Panzer-Regiment Großdeutschland (16.67:1), schwere

-Abteilung 103 (12.82:1) and schwere Panzer-Abteilung 502 (13.08:1). These numbers must be set against the opportunity cost of building the expensive Tiger. Every Tiger built cost as much as four Sturmgeschütz III assault guns. On 7 July 1943, a single Tiger tank commanded by SS-Oberscharführer Franz Staudegger from the 2nd Platoon of 13th Panzer Company of 1st SS Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler engaged a group of about 50 T-34s around Psyolknee (the southern sector of the German salient in the

). Staudegger used all his ammunition in destroying 22 Soviet tanks, while the rest retreated. For this, Staudegger was awarded the

. On 8 August 1944, a single Tiger commanded by SS-Unterscharführer Willi Fey from the 1st Company of sSSPzAbt 102, engaged a British tank column, destroying some 14 out of 15 Shermans, followed by one more later in the day using his last two rounds of ammunition. sSSPzAbt 102 lost all of its Tigers during fighting in Normandy, but reported 227 Allied tanks destroyed in six weeks. The Tiger is particularly associated with SS-Haupsturmführer Michael Wittmann of schwere SS-Panzerabteilung 101. He worked his way up, commanding various vehicles and finally a Tiger I. In the Battle of Villers-Bocage, he destroyed over two dozen Allied vehicles including several tanks; and single-handedly held up the advance of the entire 7th Armoured Division until his tank was knocked out and abandoned. Over 10

had over 100 vehicle kills on their account, including: Kurt Knispel with 168 kills, Otto Carius with 150+ kills, Johannes Bölter with 139+ kills, and

with 138 kills. [edit] The captured Tiger of 1943 - Tiger 131 Tiger captured in Tunis, 1943. On 21 April 1943, a Tiger of the Schwere

-Abteilung 504 with turret number 131 was captured after a fight with Churchill tanks of the British 48th Royal Tank Regiment in Tunisia on a hill called Djebel Djaffa; shots had jammed the turret and injured the commander the crew bailed out[4] It was repaired and displayed in Tunisia before being sent to England for a thorough inspection. The Western Allies, however, did little to prepare for combat against the Tiger despite their assessment that the newly-encountered German tank was superior to their own. This conclusion was partly based on the correct estimate that the Tiger would be produced in relatively small numbers.[citation needed] It was also based on the doctrine of the United States Army, which did not place emphasis on tank-versus-tank combat, relying instead on the use of tank destroyers.[citation needed] In contrast, the more experienced British had observed the gradual increase in German AFV armor and firepower since 1940 and had anticipated the need for more powerful anti-tank guns. Work on the Ordnance QF 17 pounder had begun in late 1940 and 100 early-production guns were rushed to North Africa help counter the new Tiger threat. So great was the haste that they were sent before proper carriages had been developed, and the guns had to be mounted in the carriages of 25-pounder gun-howitzers. Efforts were hastened to get Cruiser tanks armed with 17 pounder guns into operation. The A30 Challenger was already at the prototype stage in 1942[5], but this tank was poorly protected and unreliable, and was fielded in only limited numbers. The 17 pounder-armed Sherman, the Sherman Firefly, was a notable success even though it was only intended to be a stopgap design. Fireflys were successfully used against Tigers (in one famous engagement, a single Firefly destroyed three) and over 2000 were built during the war. Six different, 17-pounder-armed, British tanks and tank-destroyers would see combat. On 25 September 1951, the captured tank was officially handed over to the Bovington Tank Museum at Bovington Camp in the UK, by the British Ministry of Supply. In June 1990, preparations were made for restoring the Tiger to full running order. In December 2003,

returned to the museum with a fully operational engine after extensive restoration by the Army Base Repair Organisation (ABRO).